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This article relates changes in higher education and research in East Asian societies 
to recent trends in political economy and, in particular, the reorientation of 
developmental states in the region. The developmental state is oriented to catch-up 
competitiveness and, as the horizon of development shifts, so do its appropriate 
institutional forms and strategies. Catch-up competitiveness is guided by economic 
imaginaries, often linked to geoeconomic, geopolitical, and broader societal 
imaginaries, whose hegemony depends on particular discursive and disciplinary 
practices. The shift in the roles of HE and research is related to the reorientation of 
developmental states from export-oriented, investment-led growth to knowledge-
intensive, investment-led growth, supplemented in some cases by efforts to create 
international financial hubs to exploit a global trend towards financialisation. These 
themes are explored through comparison of selected East Asian economies/societies. 
The article ends with some general conclusions about the state’s continuing role in 
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This contribution to the special issue of Comparative Education provides a cultural 
political economy perspective on the internationalisation of higher education (HE) in 
East Asia and interprets this as part of broader changes in the region’s political 
economy. There is a vast literature on internationalisation of HE as a convergent trend 
in world society and the intellectual value-added of this article, if any, is to put this and 
related changes in their place in terms of new economic imaginaries, the dynamics of 
variegated capitalism on a global scale, various local, national and regional responses 
to the 1997-1998 ‘Asian crisis’, and the specificities of developmental states (DSs) in 
this region.1 For, while there are certainly signs of convergence, the mechanisms 
producing this vary across economies, states, societies and regions and merit 
contextualisation. This would show the limits to convergence in a world market 
(including for education and research) that is highly variegated thanks to diverse 
complementarities and contradictions among economies at different scales within and 
beyond East Asia (see, for example, the contributions in Menkhoff et al., 2011). 
 
The ‘Asian crisis’ that erupted in 1997 prompted a search for alternative economic and 
political strategies and related efforts to recalibrate and reorient DSs. While these 
attempts were mainly national, they were shaped by two major economic imaginaries 
and associated paradigms that were circulating in advanced economies too: the 
knowledge-based economy (KBE) and neoliberal financialisation. In this context, 
imaginary denotes meaning systems that cognitively simplify an inordinately complex 
world as a condition of “going on” within it, frame individual subjects’ “lived experience” 
of that world, and/or inform collective action oriented thereto (Sum and Jessop 2013, 
165). The KBE imaginary extrapolates past and present social trends into a 
performative vision of the future to shape an economic dynamic that seeks to valorise 
“knowledge” as the key driver of economic growth, wealth generation, and job creation 
in the private, public, and “third” sectors (Olssen and Peters 2005; Godin 2006; Jessop 
2008; Hornidge 2011). It has major implications for the reorganisation and 
reorientation of the wider society at multiple sites and scales and in many social fields. 
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It can also take neo-statist, neo-corporatist, neo-liberal, neo-communitarian and hybrid 
forms (Jessop 2002). Financialisation is another general economic and social trend 
(for an overview, see van der Zwan 2014) that is strongly promoted by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank among other international agencies. In its neo-
liberal form, however, it leads to finance-dominated accumulation, which privileges 
financial capital over other kinds of capital, with pervasive repercussions on virtually 
all social relations as well as creating special kinds of crisis (see Jessop 2013). 
 
These imaginaries and associated policy paradigms have distinctive implications for 
the roles of HE in economic and social development. The OECD and World Bank (and 
macro-regional affiliates, such as the Asian Development Bank), and, more recently, 
the European Union have been promoting the KBE strongly from the mid-1990s (a key 
document is OECD 1996; on the World Bank as an education policy governor, see 
Mundy and Verger 2015). However, whereas the OECD has been fairly consistent in 
its advocacy, the World Bank’s position has changed considerably. It now argues that 
the returns to investment in HE are greater than in basic education and is more aware 
of the limitations of market-driven reforms (see Obamba 2013). The KBE concept was 
anticipated in the notions of “information economy” and “information society” in Japan 
(Umesao 1963; Masuda 1981), where it influenced policy significantly from the 1980s; 
it was also adopted relatively early in some first- and second-generation East Asian 
newly industrialised countries (hereafter EANICS), which also promoted national 
systems of innovation, the learning economy, and the KBE (for a comprehensive 
overview, see Hornidge 2011). 
 
The main contemporary global rival to the KBE (broadly interpreted) as an economic 
imaginary and strategy is finance-led accumulation, which prioritises the deregulation 
and liberalisation of finance, the role of financial capital and capital markets in 
allocating capital to different activities, the financialisation of all economic sectors 
including, through market proxies, the public sector, and the internationalisation of 
financial flows (van der Zwan 2014). Financialisation arrived in East Asia as much 
through external pressure from trading partners and international organisations and 
through a massive increase in global liquidity, leading to greater financial integration 
of the world market (UNCTAD 2015), as it did through deliberate imitation or emulation 
of advanced, often neoliberal, economies and through explicit domestic goal-setting. 
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Nationally, financialisation tends to be a secondary strategy in the EANICS compared 
to the KBE strategy and is linked to the growing importance of capital markets, 
especially venture capital and similar markets, in corporate finance compared to the 
earlier primacy of state credit relations. Promoting financialisation is an important part 
of government strategies in the region and is reflected in international ‘financial hub’ 
strategies, especially at metropolitan or city-state level. This is seen in South Korea 
and Singapore as part of their new catch-up competitiveness strategies as well as in 
the enhanced priority given to finance in Hong Kong’s strategy to become ‘Asia’s 
World City’ and in its new significance in the PRC, especially in Shanghai’s resurgence 
as a global financial centre, the promotion of Shenzhen, and the rise of Beijing. 
 
The developmental state and the knowledge-based economy 
 
A developmental state (hereafter DS) is a state that plans, orchestrates or steers 
economic, political and societal strategies that are oriented to catching up with a more 
advanced (not necessarily the most advanced) reference economy or associated 
economic growth dynamic (Jessop 2016) This definition is not limited to EANICs or 
other national states but covers such strategies over longer time spans, at different 
scales, and in different kinds of polity (for a recent survey, see Caldentev 2008; also 
Reinert 2004, Green 2007; Beeson 2009; Pereira 2008). Moreover, while these 
strategies may target specific places, spaces, scales, and competitors, they are 
inevitably mediated via the world market – especially as this becomes more integrated 
through neoliberal strategies of market completion. The DS is a sub-type of 
competition state, which is a state that aims to create conditions for competitiveness 
within its borders and/or gain competitive advantages for enterprises based therein by 
promoting the economic and extra-economic actions currently deemed vital for 
success in competition with economic actors, sectors, and spaces in other states 
(Cerny 1990; Jessop 2002, 2016). 
 
Successful catch-up competitiveness strategies are based on the following principles: 
 
1) National wealth cannot be created or based on raw material production in the 
absence of a manufacturing/increasing returns sector. 
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2) An inefficient manufacturing/increasing returns sector provides a much higher 
standard of living than no manufacturing sector (Reinert 2004). 
 
Three further points are worth noting. First, the idea of ‘competitiveness’ is discursively 
constructed and rests on specific economic imaginaries, often articulated to geo-
economic, geopolitical and social imaginaries oriented to state- and nation-building or 
other major societal goals. This opens space for discursive struggles over the nature 
and bases of competitiveness. Different economic imaginaries imply different forms of 
political action with different effects on the competitive positioning of firms, sectors, 
cities, regions, and nations as well as on the domestic and international balance of 
forces. Second, as the leading edge of economic competition alters, so do patterns of 
competitive advantage and, hence, the demands of catch-up competitiveness. Third, 
crucially, education and research are now regarded as a critical ‘increasing returns’ 
sector with major benefits to the economy and civil society. Education is now seen as 
a branch of the economy rather than an extra-economic sphere with wide social 
functions. This is a global trend with specific resonance and impact in East Asia. 
 
The Asian crisis prompted a re-evaluation of DS strategies which were initially based on 
labour-intensive production2 and, in a second, sometimes overlapping stage, on neo-
mercantilist, investment-led growth oriented to export-driven catch-up competitiveness. 
This illustrates the role of crises as both threat and opportunity – here triggering or 
accelerating innovation-led, KBE strategies (on factor-, investment-, and innovation-
driven competitiveness, see Porter 1990). This is reflected in broad discursive, policy, 
and institutional changes in government and governance in and across the region. 
 
Discursively, new terms proliferated, such as national innovation systems, the KBE, 
K-economy, learning society, networked learning society, HE clusters, knowledge 
hubs, transnational education hubs, creative economy, smart cities, biopolis, triple 
helix, knowledge triangles, entrepreneurial universities, and entrepreneurial 
academics. These complementary technical, economic, educational and social 
imaginaries serve as aspirational self-descriptions of an economy or society 
(identifying what often exists only in embryo or potentia) and, in favourable 
circumstances, may guide a critical mass of expectations, state policies, organisational 
and institutional strategies and innovation, and so on to align and coordinate them with 
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these views. The reorientation and reorganisation of HE is only one aspect of these 
broader sets of putative changes and should also be considered in this wider context. 
 
Examples of policy reorientations are: 
• Taiwan’s commitment under the Democratic Progressive Party to become a 
‘Green Silicon Island’ based on the KBE, sustainable development, and social 
justice as well as its promotion of an ‘e-Taiwan’ project to build e-business, e-
government, and an e-society (Chen and Lee 2004). 
• South Korea’s strategy to become a KBE, endorsed by the OECD and World 
Bank (Chu 2009) and its associated Brain Korea 21 and Brain Korea 21 Plus 
projects to boost research-intensive universities, develop a national innovation 
system, and build stronger and denser links between HEIs and industry (Suh 
and Chen 2007). 
• Singapore’s strategy to become an “Intelligent Island”, initiated in 1992 and 
currently in its sixth iteration, set out in 2006, under the rubric of “Intelligent 
Nation 2015”, intended to exploit its self-described competitive advantage as a 
highly educated city-state and to promote innovation in creative industries (NCB 
1992; Choo 1997; Hornidge 2010; IDA 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). 
• Albeit more rhetorically, Hong Kong’s strategy in the late 1990s (advocated by 
consultants and scholars linked to Massachusetts Institute of Technology) to 
re-industrialize the city-state based on high-tech and creative industries (on 
this, Masayama and Vandenbrink 2003; Lee and Cheng 2011; Sum 2010). 
 
These discursive and strategic policy shifts have been reflected in turn in institutional 
transformations, with new ministries (or new names, marking a strategic reorientation), 
new planning instruments, the expansion and simultaneous stratification of the 
education sector at different levels, new research bodies and incentives, and so on. 
 
The information (later, knowledge) economy arose as a theoretical paradigm in the 
1960s. It drew on ideas about the creatively destructive nature of innovation, the 
virtues of entrepreneurial competition, and long waves in economic development 
associated with different leading edge and supporting technologies (Schumpeter 
1934). This paradigm was translated into a broader policy paradigm in the 1980s 
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based on observation of DS strategies in East Asia and became quite explicit in the 
1990s, thanks to the OECD, World Bank, and European Union, among other actors. 
Policy-makers used it to guide economic and social strategies to become more 
competitive by using information and communication technologies and moving into 
knowledge- and design-intensive sectors to renew older branches and develop new 
ones in goods and services. More recently, the KBE has been integrated in even more 
simplified form into several consultancy packages marketed amid great hype as 
reliable tools to boost competitiveness from rural areas and inner cities to macro-
regions like the EU (besides Michael Porter’s Monitor consultancy, Richard Florida’s 
work on creative economies was influential in East Asia; for overviews and critiques, 
see Peck 2010; Sum 2010). Indeed, the KBE is a master narrative that shapes 
economic strategies, state projects, and societal visions from cities and regions via 
national and supranational states to international agencies and global regimes. 
 
In significant respects, of course, every economy is a knowledge economy in so far as 
tacit, embedded, and codified knowledge are key aspects of production, circulation, 
and consumption. So we might ask what, if anything, is new about the modern KBE 
apart from the prominence of terms such as knowledge economy, knowledge-driven 
or knowledge-based economy (and equivalents in other languages) in contemporary 
economic imaginaries, economic and political strategies, and the self-descriptions and 
narratives of economic, political, and other social entities. In ideal-typical terms, the 
primary aspect of today’s KBE is the valorisation and application of knowledge as the 
key factor in boosting the efficiency, competitiveness, profitability and/or effectiveness 
of the private, public and third sectors of the economy, improving governance, and 
enhancing the quality of life. This poses issues around the commodification of 
knowledge as intellectual property and its circulation as an intellectual commons. This 
tension is seen in OECD discourses on the role of universities in the KBE, especially 
concerning whether this is to provide a public good or to provide private benefit for 
students and other stakeholders (Hunter 2013; and below).3 And it poses particular 
problems for DS strategies where access to knowledge protected by various kinds of 
property rights or de facto monopolies is crucial to development until their economies 




Attempts to valorise knowledge involve (1) the radical expansion, differentiation, and 
recombination of diverse fields of knowledge, invention, innovation, and creativity 
involved in material and immaterial production; (2) efforts to create and valorise design- 
and knowledge-intensive capital and manage the tensions between the intellectual 
commons and intellectual property; (3) measures to facilitate technological intelligence 
gathering, create independent technological capacities and promote innovative 
capacities, technical competence, and technology transfer; (4) policies to make labour 
markets more flexible, reorient social policy towards flexicurity, reskill and upgrade the 
workforce (including through a tough global war for talents), and promote entrepreneurial 
skills; and (5) an increasingly deliberate and reflexive application of knowledge to the 
production of knowledge to transform the technical and social forces of production. 
 
The OECD, World Bank (and its regional affiliates), and the European Union have 
been major advocates of the KBE. The OECD led the way in articulating the concept 
and constructing data bases to compare and rank progress towards the KBE nirvana. 
The World Bank advocated “Knowledge for Development” policies as the best route 
to economic progress in “developing economies” (Robertson 2008). And, in its 2000 
Lisbon Agenda, the EU committed itself, albeit unsuccessfully, to becoming the most 
competitive KBE in the world by 2010. Other international agencies have jumped on 
the KBE bandwagon. Examples include the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Regional economic blocs and intergovernmental bodies are also active. Examples 
include the Arab League, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (notably, its Economic 
Committee), ASEAN, NAFTA, various parts of the United Nations (UNCTAD, UNECE, 
UNESCO, UNPD, CEPAL, etc.), Mercosur (the Latin American trade bloc), and the 
Viségrad Four in Central Europe. Similar economic (albeit not always social) policies 
are being rolled out elsewhere by national states with quite different roles in the global 
division of labour (e.g., Colombia, Germany, New Zealand, South Korea, the United 
Arab Emirates, and the USA) as well as by diverse provinces, metropolitan regions, 
and small cities. Many other international organisations as well as regional blocs in the 





Education as one element in the knowledge-based economy 
 
In response to the crisis in post-war growth regimes in advanced capitalist economies, 
education was criticised for its mismatch with a changing economy, creating slower 
growth and high unemployment. Emphasis later turned to its vital role in building 
human capital and the knowledge base to support economic competition in a global 
KBE (Peters 2001). Similar criticisms occurred in the EANICS from the 1990s onwards 
and led to a similar emphasis on recalibrating the economic significance of education 
(on Korea, see Suh and Chen 2007). This overturns Bell’s forecast (1973) that post-
industrialism would see profit-oriented industrial enterprises lose their previously 
dominant role in industrial society to commons-oriented universities. Yet these now 
tend to act like competitive, revenue-maximising enterprises that also aim to serve 
various local, urban, regional, national, or even supranational KBEs. Indeed, for 
Etzkowitz, a leading researcher on the “triple helix” interface between universities, 
business and the state, also writing during the transition period: 
 
Virtually every country that has a university, whether it was founded for 
reasons of education or prestige, is now attempting to organize knowledge-
based economic development. … As the university becomes more dependent 
upon industry and government, so have industry and government become 
more dependent upon the university. In the course of the 'second academic 
revolution' a new social contract is being drawn up between the university and 
the wider society, in which public funding for the university is made contingent 
upon a more direct contribution to the economy (Etzkowitz 1994, 149, 151; 
compare Etzkowitz 2008; Leydesdorff 2010). 
 
Reflecting these new economic imaginaries, promoting national and regional systems 
of innovation alongside vocational training and lifelong learning to boost transferable 
and specific skills became a central component of economic and social policy. 
Following initial calls for labour market flexibility and welfare austerity, the OECD later 
advocated measures to promote structural and/or systemic competitiveness based on 
extra-economic as well as economic practices and institutions. Developing a KBE 
became an explicit objective and was often linked to neo-Schumpeterian arguments 
about the shifting frontiers of technological innovation. In the 2000s, building capacity 
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in science/technology/engineering/mathematics (STEM subjects) was stressed along 
with applied as well as basic research to create profitable products. A strong counter-
trend to these priorities stressed the role of creative and cultural industries. Pressure 
also grew to lower the fiscal ‘burden’ of vocational training, further education and HE, 
reflected in measures to make HEIs compete for students and funding, cut or share 
costs, and become more entrepreneurial in raising external funds (Hunter 2013). 
 
Three trends are noteworthy here. First, HE is increasingly construed as a directly 
economic factor to be governed in conjunction with other such factors to boost 
economic competitiveness rather than viewed in terms of its functional differentiation 
and specialisation within a stable social order. It is judged in terms of its economic 
efficiency and contributions to national systems of innovation, learning economy, KBE 
and “enterprise culture”. Moreover, following the neoliberal agenda, higher educational 
services are being liberalised, de-regulated, privatised, and exposed to (inter-)national 
competition; funding sources are diversified; students are becoming sought-after 
mobile customers of these services; and knowledge and creativity are being 
commodified and intellectual property rights extended in scope and duration. 
Employers and practitioners are getting more involved in curriculum development; 
managers are drawn into educational governance and agenda-setting; mobility 
between the academy and non-academic worlds is fostered; and colleges and 
universities deliver lifelong learning (Teichler 1998). Relatedly, responsibility for 
finding gainful employment is shifted to individual workers – whether as enterprising 
individuals investing in their human capital or as equal citizens entitled to support from 
the state and social partners to improve their skills (see Brown, Lauder and Ashton 
2011). East Asian DSs took this turn earlier, treating education as vital for economic 
performance at all stages from kindergarten through to HE. 
 
Second, education is increasingly construed in post-national terms (especially in HE 
and scientific research) and is being reorganised at various scales, including in diverse 
transversal, cross-national and multi-scalar ways (Marginson and Rhoades 2002). 
Reflecting the trend to internationalization, there is now a growing international 
industry of accreditation, quality assurance, standardisation, and benchmarking 
(Hartmann 2008). A parallel process is the multiplication of rankings to compare, order, 
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and discipline schools, universities, and research institutions and their contribution to 
competitiveness (Hazelkorn 2015). 
 
And, third, even where, against recent global trends, HE remains firmly embedded in 
the public sector, it is judged in terms of its impact on economic development (at 
regional, national, and supranational levels) and competitiveness (Godin 2006; Olssen 
and Peters 2005). The growth of closer and more continuous contacts with business, 
the professions, government and local communities is clearest in STEM subjects. 
There is more emphasis on patenting, technology transfer, research parks, 
commercial spin-offs, science and technology parks, incubators, consultancy services. 
But the same trend is seen in the humanities and social sciences regarding their 
impact on competitiveness and their contribution to the creative, cultural and copyright 
industries, government agendas, and capacities for social control. 
 
These changes open space for monitoring mechanisms that can be adapted to 
changing global, regional, national and local conditions to rank, benchmark, and 
discipline units of assessment through the gaze of a paper panopticon. In addition to 
generic indexes of global economic competitiveness, many of which include quality of 
education and research (Sum 2010), and the World Bank Institute’s Knowledge Index 
and Knowledge Economy Index, there are specific rankings for universities (notably, 
the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Academic Ranking of World Universities [ARWU], 
the Times Higher Education Supplement World University Rankings, and the QS Top 
Universities). Although criticised on scientific and policy grounds (e.g., Lall 2001; 
Marginson and van der Wende 2007; Hazelkorn 2015), they have disciplinary power 
in ranking units of assessment (countries, cities, schools, universities, departments, 
faculty members, etc.), publicising their strengths and weaknesses, recording their 
performance over time, and defining their current rank order. Annual revisions 
institutionalise a continuous gaze with performative effects far beyond their robustness 
and face validity. They drive an accelerating treadmill of competitiveness that creates 
pressures to follow best practice and adopt the latest strategic recipes based on the 
most recent, or still fashionable, economic imaginaries. The traditional Humboldtian 
model of university governance based on a community of scholars and students is 
being challenged by demands for greater accountability to a multi-tiered state system 
and to business interests ranging from small- and medium-sized firms to national and 
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international champions. This holds even for world-class universities, which gain some 
autonomy from national pressures only to face them on a global scale (on the problems 
that this has created in Japan, see Tsuruta 2013). These pressures extend across an 
ever-expanding range of economic and extra-economic factors and has produced a 
veritable ‘education industry’ mind-set that affects the self-identity and actions of those 
charged with the governance of higher education and research. 
 
Implications for higher education and research 
 
Schumpeter identified five areas of innovation: (1) the introduction of a new good or a 
new quality of a good; (2) the introduction of a new method of production or a new way 
of commercially handling a commodity; (3) the opening of new markets for one’s own 
products; (4) securing a new source of supply of raw materials or half-finished goods; 
and (5) the reorganisation of an industry, for example, the creation of a new cartel or 
monopoly position, or the breaking up of existing cartels or monopolies (Schumpeter 
1934: 129-35). Successful competition in these areas allows, in the short-term, 
monopoly profits. In a well-functioning market, however, these higher profit-levels will 
eventually be competed away as other firms adopt these innovations or seek to 
counter them with their own innovations (whether competitive or anti-competitive). In 
addition to the immediate relevance of Schumpeter’s schema to the KBE considered 
as a whole, including the competing away of temporary competitive advantages as 
others imitate or improve on these innovations, there are also analogous forms of 
innovation and treadmill effects in HE. Thus entrepreneurial HE institutions may: 
 
(1) Provide new preparatory courses; extend degree programmes; introduce new or 
enhanced programmes in HE, professional training, and research that reflect new 
disciplines, new economic and political priorities, or major shifts in the cutting edge 
and supporting technologies of new waves of economic and social development. 
 
(2) Introduce new methods of teaching and research, copy “best practices”, exploit 
new or enhanced information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures and 
“infostructures”, seek to cut costs and boost efficiency by standardising or 
commoditising education, find new ways to deliver their ‘products’, such as offering 
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on-line rather than correspondence courses for part-time, continuing and distance 
education, or providing English-medium teaching. 
 
(3) Open new markets – for example, in validating degrees or internationalisation of 
education. This occurs by diversifying the source of students (Wildavsky 2010), 
opening international branches (this can be done alone, through twinning, 
partnerships, consortia, and franchising or other commercial ties), introducing 1+2 or 
2+2 courses, or developing new kinds of regional education hubs in Asia, with 
progressively more demanding inputs and outputs (Knight and Morshidi 2011). 
 
(4a) Secure a new source of supply of raw materials or half-finished goods – analogies 
could include widening the recruitment base for students of all ages, the global 
competition for talent (sourcing post-graduate and post-doctoral researchers from 
abroad, introducing “flying faculty” or recruiting world-class or international faculty); or, 
conversely, resort to adjunct, flexible, or casual intellectual labour (e.g., Hawkins and 
Xu 2012 on “brain circulation” in the Asia Pacific region). 
 
(4b) Find new funding sources besides the public purse or student fees – including 
business and third sector research contracts, third mission activities, patents and 
royalties, private-public partnerships, wealthy donors, and alumni programmes; for 
states, open the education sector to private enterprise and foreign direct investment. 
 
(5) Reorganise the ‘education industry’ and scientific research by investing heavily in 
creating ‘world-class’ universities that can challenge existing educational and research 
hierarchies in the interests of boosting the competitiveness of national KBEs. 
 
The overall result of the first four kinds of innovation is an “academic capitalism” that 
turns faculty members into enterprising bearers of intellectual capital on behalf of 
entrepreneurial universities (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Slaughter and Rhoades 
2004). The fifth kind of innovation indicates that the entrepreneurial university à la 
Schumpeter should also be related to the strategic reorientation of DSs as the horizons 
of catch-up competitiveness shift towards innovation-led development and the scope 
and size of the “market” for education and research are extended. East Asia is 
prominent here, with growing financial and political commitment to education, research 
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and development. This affects governance in internal management, accounting, audit, 
learning modes, incentives, career tracks, and so on as well as regarding external 
partnerships, knowledge transfer, political guidance, and government controls (for a 
good overview of shifts in East Asian HE governance, see Mok 2007). 
 
Two apparently contrary but actually complementary strategies are being adopted. On 
the one hand, states are pushing the contribution of education to vital economic 
interests as redefined in the light of new hegemonic economic imaginaries; and, on 
the other hand, states are conceding greater autonomy to educational institutions in 
how they serve these interests. Whereas the first strategy reaffirms the character of 
education as a “public good”, the second regards it as a business, subjects it to market 
disciplines, and treats it as a “private good” (Marginson 1999, 122; Hunter 2013). 
Together, these strategies reinforce the primacy of economic calculation in the HE 
sector and tend to create an increasingly stratified hierarchy of institutions stretching 
from world-class or leading research universities, located at the cutting-edge of the 
KBE and transformational technologies, which attract global talents and engage in 
international research cooperation, to institutions that specialise in cost-effective mass 
credentialisation and opportunities for life-long learning at a more local or regional 
scale. In all cases, however, there is growing emphasis on close links to the users and 
stakeholders so that economic needs are met as far as possible. 
 
Some East Asian vignettes 
 
There is little turnover in the top 100 universities (still US-dominated) but, depending 
on the index, Asia has 4 (ARWU), 11 (THES), or 19 (QS) in the top 100 in 2015; and 
17 (ARWU), 19 (THES), and 39 (QS) in the top 200 (see the respective websites). 
These data show improvements over earlier years and there is even more upward 
mobility in the top 400 thanks to concerted efforts in Asian economies to improve their 
position (Postiglione and Arimoto 2015). Indeed, the Shanghai ARWU index was 
“developed as a strategic tool to help set an appropriate standard and target for China” 
(Hazelkorn 2015, xviii). More generally, this striving occurs through DS support and 
sponsorship, encouraged in many cases by the World Bank and regional affiliates, to 
make HE and research a key driver in competitiveness within a much broader vision 




Japan, China, and South Korea have large and strong bases in profit-producing 
(industrial and post-industrial) sectors and all three invest heavily in world-class or 
internationally competitive education and research oriented to new technological 
frontiers, including knowledge-intensive business services as well as other design- 
and knowledge-intensive services. Taiwan shares this orientation. As smaller city-
states with larger cross-border hinterlands, Hong Kong and Singapore have 
consolidated their positions as service economies and are also, respectively, the third 
and fourth most important global financial centres in 2015 after London and New York. 
Tokyo and Seoul come fifth and sixth but are part of much larger economies (Qatar 
Financial Centre Authority 2015). All four East Asian global financial centres aim to 
strengthen their position through active state support for further financialisation 
(Economic Review Committee 2002; Lai 2012; Park 2011). I now present some 
vignettes on how East Asian DSs have been recalibrating and reorienting their catch-




In response to the 1997-8 “Asian” crisis, the Republic of Korea made several neoliberal 
policy adjustments in its approach to economic development without undertaking a 
more radical neoliberal regime shift. It also reoriented its catch-up strategy towards 
the knowledge economy (cf. Taiwan’s contemporaneous commitment to becoming a 
technologically advanced nation). Following the 2007-8 “global financial crisis”, this 
reorientation of the DS state towards the KBE was reaffirmed when, under President 
Lee Myung-bak, the government created a Ministry of the Knowledge Economy (MKE) 
in 2008. Its mission was to promote the knowledge economy, which would add value 
to traditional goods and services through greater levels of research and innovation 
intelligence, adding value and making them more competitive globally. It declared that, 
‘different from other economic models which rely primarily on natural resources or 
manpower, knowledge will be the primary engine of productivity and growth for the 
Korean economy’ (italics in original). Above all, the Ministry aimed ‘to assemble 
traditional industrial know-how, cutting edge R&D, and strong pro-business policies’ 
(Ministry of the Knowledge Economy 2008). Its remit also included developing new 
growth engines by supporting ICTs and high-end manufacturing, promoting foreign 
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trade, attracting FDI, and developing environmentally-friendly projects by promoting a 
green economy (Erawatch 2012). 
 
This strategy was revived by another new ministry in 2013: the Ministry of Science, 
ICT and Future Planning (MSIP), which was tasked with leading the development, 
coordination and implementation of ‘creative economy’ policies. This initiative reflected 
the vision of incoming President Park Geun-hye. She wanted to create a ‘Second 
Miracle on the Han River’ by promoting a “creative economy”. This would stimulate 
growth and employment through “the convergence of science and technology with 
industry, the fusion of culture and industry, and the blossoming of creativity” (Park 
2013). This reflects a belief that “the global economic paradigm is shifting from a 
‘Knowledge Economy’ to a ‘Creative Economy’, which creates added value through 
innovative technologies and creative ideas” (MOTIE 2015). Reflecting a neo-
Schumpeterian view of economic development, President Park’s programme praises 
entrepreneurs as “carriers of innovation” in products, services, processes, markets, 
and business models. Core manufacturing industries are still crucial here but the 
chaebol no longer have a privileged position. Thus the programme has six strategic 
pillars: an ecosystem that encourages start-up companies; a strengthened economic 
role for start-ups and small- and medium-enterprises and measures to enhance their 
ability to enter global markets; generate new industries as growth engines; foster 
world-class creative talent; strengthen science, technology, and ICT to promote 
innovation; and spur a creative economic culture within Korean society (Connell 2013). 
 
As a secondary strategy, favoured by the IMF and World Bank, demanded by domestic 
firms outside “the iron triangle of bank-chaebol-government” (Fukugawa 1998), and 
endorsed by central government, South Korea has spurred financialisation to back this 
initiative (e.g., facilitating venture capital and promoting KOSDAQ in imitation of 
NASDAQ as automated exchanges for high-tech, start-up companies) and developing 
plans to transform South Korea into an international financial hub linked, in part, to its 




Singapore also illustrates the survival and adaptation of the DS strategy in new 
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circumstances. The state retains a prominent economic role thanks to its control of the 
land market, key role in the allocation of capital, and influence over housing, 
employment, infrastructure and “infostructure”. Consistent with the state’s continual 
recalibration of its catch-up competitiveness strategy when it gained independence as 
a small, resource-poor island in 1965, Singapore’s government is now pursuing an 
Intelligent Nation strategy, building on its previous mass education, reskilling, smart 
city and intelligent island strategies and its 2004 commitment to develop a “national 
innovation system” (on this concept, see Nelson 1993). This reflects the KBE strategy 
of investing in world class education and ICT to enhance global competitiveness 
According to a Minister of Education, Teo Chee Hean, Singapore has a vision: 
 
… to become the Boston of the East. Boston is not just MIT or Harvard. The 
greater Boston area boasts of over 200 universities, colleges, research 
institutes and thousands of companies. It is a focal point of creative energy; a 
hive of intellectual, research, commercial and social activity. We want to create 
an oasis of talent in Singapore: a knowledge hub, an “ideas-exchange”, a 
confluence of people and idea streams, an incubator for inspiration (Teo, 2000, 
cited in Mok, 2008, 532). 
 
The strategy begins in kindergarten and is linked to the slogan: “Thinking Schools, 
Learning Nation”. Internationalisation is crucial here in schools, colleges, further and 
higher education and the regional education hub initiative has been branded as “The 
Global Schoolhouse”. Alongside recruiting students and faculty from the wider region, 
world-class universities have been attracted to Singapore to set up joint programmes, 
research partnerships, and branch campuses. As in Korea, education and research 
are being reoriented to fifth and sixth Kondratieff long wave technologies, such as 
biotech, biomedical, creative industries, health care, and green technologies. 
Moreover, consistent with this strategy, the state pays retraining fees (Gopinathan 
2007). Matching the “Boston of the East” vision, the state is also promoting the “One-
North Project” modelled after Silicon Valley to create a high-tech research community. 
 
A related strategic aim is to attract R&D firms and multinational companies specialising 
in the knowledge economy and service industries (Knight and Morshidi 2011). And, 
again reflecting the new mantra of the creative economy, Singapore is building on its 
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1990s national cultural policies to promote Singapore as a “Global City of the Arts” 
and to develop the cultural, creative and copyright industries (Hornidge 2011). 
Changes in HE governance that align with World Bank polices have also been 
implemented: partial privatisation; attracting inward investment; corporatisation; 
internal competition; private-public partnerships; the user pays principle; and 
accountability to stakeholders (Mok 2008). Like Taiwan, Singapore has improved its 
ranking substantially on the World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Index from 1995 to 
the present (Asian Development Bank 2014). Finally, as in South Korea, the state aims 





Hong Kong’s economic strategies reflect conflicts between profit-producing and 
financial capital. After its 1997 ‘return to the motherland’, there were two rival 
strategies. The first, recommended by scholars and consultants associated with MIT, 
was to redevelop its industrial base through re-industrialisation in high tech sectors, 
creative industries, and closer tighter integration of finance and industry. The second 
strategy, promoted by scholars and consultants linked to Harvard Business School, 
was to strengthen Hong Kong’s role as a financial and business services centre and 
maintain the close ties between the finance and real estate sectors (Sum 2010). Tung 
Che-Hwa, the then Chief Executive, aligned himself with the former strategy in his 
2004 Policy Address, aiming to turn Hong Kong into ‘Asia’s World City’, including 
making it a regional hub in higher education (Knight and Morshidi 2011). However, 
financial and property interests exploited the 2007-8 financial crisis to reorient 
government strategy. Thus, while maintaining plans to boost educational, medical, 
testing and certification, and cultural and creative services, a new Chief Executive (and 
former financial secretary), Donald Tsang, affirmed a finance-led strategy to 
consolidate Hong Kong’s position as a low tax, low public spending, global financial 
centre and key supplier of business services to an ever more powerful China (Lee and 
Cheng 2011; Knight and Morshidi 2011). This fitted China’s ambitions to use Hong 







The same strategic orientation is seen in second-tier emerging markets such as 
Malaysia, which Malaysia’s “2020 vision” and master planning to move from a 
commodity-exporting and low-wage, labour-intensive economy to a “K-economy” 
(Prime Minister’s Department 2001). Knowledge for development has been crucial 
here, initially through investment in mass education, training, and reskilling and more 
recently through continuing commitment to upgrading the skilled workfare and 
promoting HE, knowledge and innovation. In 2007 it established a Ministry of Higher 
Education to make and implement long-term plans to strengthen the ties between 
education and economic development and, in line with World Bank recommendations, 
promote liberalisation and privatisation (including greater encouragement to private 
education institutions), improve efficiency, reduce the burden on the public purse, and 
contribute to Malaysia’s global competitiveness by increasing critical mass in science 
and technology (World Bank and Economic Planning Unit 2007). A related initiative is 
to develop a regional education hub (Azman, Sirat and Karim 2010). Two initiatives 
here, which are part of bigger commercial and residential projects (and may, therefore, 
also be read as real estate developments) are an ‘Educity’, situated near Singapore, 
and a Kuala Lumpur Education City (Knight and Morshidi 2011). Indeed, here as 
elsewhere, KBE discourse can be used to legitimate actions and investments 




This article presents no fresh data on the internationalisation of HE in East Asia. Its 
aim was to put this trend in its place in (East Asian) political economy. Specifically it 
explored the strategic reorientation and structural transformation in East Asian DSs in 
response to the 1997-8 “Asian” crisis and the “global financial crisis” that erupted in 
2007-8 as guided by hegemonic economic imaginaries that were circulating in diverse 
theoretical and policy spaces. This approach offers a more specific account than 
invoking general trends such as globalisation, internationalisation, or competitiveness 
focusing instead on (dis)continuities in catch-up strategies in East Asia compared with 
other sites in a variegated world economy. Thus, while affirming the familiar narrative 
about the internationalisation of HE, which results from shared strategies as well as 
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structural drift, the article looks beyond convergent empirical trends to particular path-
dependent legacies of East Asian political economy that define specific path-shaping 
opportunities in changing regional and global contexts. It also turned from 
internationalisation as such towards the broader role of education as an increasingly 
critical factor in KBE strategies (loosely defined) and interpreted the latter in terms of 
the emergence, selection, and consolidation of a new economic imaginary to make 
sense of, and guide responses to crisis. In short, the KBE should be understood as a 
theoretical and policy paradigm with performative effects rather than a simple 
description of objective tendencies unfolding “behind the backs” of producers, 
managers, and consumers of knowledge and policy-makers. It also has specific 
strategic and structural selectivities. 
 
As the World Bank notes, the KBE has different implications at different stages of 
economic development. Further, the scope for knowledge economies also depends 
on the articulation among local, regional, national and quasi-continental economies. 
For example, while the US leads in world-class universities, its broader education 
system (especially in STEM subjects) has serious structural weaknesses; indeed, 
relative to the size and wealth of its economy, it actually underperforms on university 
rankings by 4-10 percent (Hazelkorn 2015, xiv). The resulting gap is being filled by 
“well-trained international graduate students and skilled immigrants from countries 
such as India, China, Korea and Singapore (the last two of which rank at the top in 
mathematics and science achievement)” (Chellaraj, Maskus and Mattoo 2004, 2, cited 
Hazelkorn 2015, xiv). This indicates the role of complementarities in a variegated world 
market (also in the global war for talents) as well as the scope for new forms of 
imperialism and colonialism based on uneven development. It also supports the self-
described speculative hypothesis that “knowledge capitalism will exhibit different 
patterns of production, ownership and innovation according to five basic regional 
models of capitalism” (Olssen and Peters 2005, 339).4 Anna-Katharina Hornidge 
likewise observed in her review of national information infrastructure projects in the 
1980s that Japan hoped to overcome the hollowing out of its manufacturing industry, 
the European Union to address the pressures of global competition and stagflation, 
and the USA to resolve an infrastructural crisis (Hornidge 2011, 32). Indeed, as 
indicated above, internationalisation is mediated through the specific place and 
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functions of HEIs as local, regional, national, and transnational champions in 
accumulation strategies, state projects, and hegemonic visions. 
 
For East Asia, while there may be a “Confucian” tradition (Marginson 2011), the recent 
importance attached to education, especially HE and research, has much to do with 
the sequencing of developmental state catch-up competitiveness strategies as each 
strategy showed signs of exhaustion, was successfully copied by emerging markets 
elsewhere in the region or wider world market, or was exposed as vulnerable by acute 
national, regional or global crises. This explains the timing of the KBE shift after the 
“Asian” crisis, which happened to coincide with its more general advocacy by the 
OECD and World Bank; and this turn also benefitted from the latecomer advantages 
of a developmental state that had a strong record of, and capacities for, investing in 
education, training, and reskilling. Likewise, as perceived horizons of competitive 
advantage now include financialisation and as GATS, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
and TiSA (Trade in Services Agreement) require the opening of financial as well as 
educational markets, we also observe plans to establish international financial hubs 
as well as transnational education hubs that are based on revamped developmental 
state capacities oriented not only to regulatory changes but also to creating the 
infrastructure and infostructure needed to realise financial hub strategies with all their 
agglomeration, networked and cluster effects. A final remark in regard to both 
strategies is required, namely, that there is “many a slip ‘twixt cup and lip”. Many more 
strategies are proposed than can possibly succeed and a wider survey of East Asian 
political economy would need to consider competing interpretations of the KBE and 
financialisation strategies as well as other rival strategies and, in addition, assess their 
feasibility at the national scale and in terms of the opportunities in a variegated 
capitalism that sets limits to what is compossible across different regional economies. 
A salutary lesson in this regard comes from the difficulties of imitating the “Silicon 
Valley” model around the world. There is no simple recipe for success and more 





 On cultural political economy, see Sum and Jessop (2013); on variegated capitalism, 
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Jessop (2015); and on developmental states, Jessop (2005. 2016). 
2
 Dubai illustrates the less common resource-intensive DS strategy directed towards 
long-term economic security and competitiveness in other areas (Joshi 2012). 
3
 The OECD’s reports on its Tertiary Education for the Knowledge-Based Economy 
project justify the need for HE reform and growth in terms of its public benefits. Yet, 
when discussing who should fund for this expansion, HE is constructed primarily as a 
private benefit (Hunter 2013, 719). 
4
 Olssen and Peters mention Anglo-American capitalism, European social market 
capitalism, French state capitalism, the Japanese model and an emergent model 
based on China’s market socialism (2005, 339). The present article also indicates 
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